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TAGS: [PREL](#) [ASEC](#) [KCRM](#) [NO](#)

SUBJECT: NORWAY: A POTENTIAL HAVEN FOR WAR CRIMINALS?

Classified By: DCM Kevin M. Johnson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. In a June 2 meeting, the head of Norway's Criminal Investigation Service noted the constraints on pursuing war crime cases in Norway. Norway is still investigating the Kabuga case, but the source placing him in Norway is not very credible. The conversation highlighted the lack of coordination within the GON on terrorism and indicated no Norwegian terrorist watch list exists. End Summary.

War Criminals

¶2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on June 2, Odd Olsen Ingero, the Director of Kripos (National Criminal Investigation Service), reviewed Norway's approach to identifying and prosecuting war criminals. He noted that Norway only checks names of proposed citizens against various Interpol and other war criminal name lists. Checks are not made of asylum seekers or at other stages prior to application for citizenship. Kripos, which was given the responsibility for war criminals in 2005, has a 10 person team working on the issue. This unit will increase to 18 staff members this summer. However, until then staffing and other resource constraints greatly limit what Kripos can do. At the moment, they have 100 open war criminal investigations, including 19 cases where the Rwandan government has identified alleged war criminals living in Norway.

¶3. (C) Turning to the specifics of two recent cases, Ingero explained that the case of the Rwandan fugitive, Felicien Kabuga, remains open as they are still investigating whether he was ever in Norway as alleged in an interview posted on an internet site. Although they have not reached a conclusion, the webmaster for the site is well known to the GON and has little credibility with Kripos. In the other case, Ingero confirmed newspaper accounts of the first ever GON extradition of a war criminal in May when Norway sent Damir Sireta, a Croatian national, to Serbia pursuant to a national war crime warrant. Sireta had been living in Norway under his real name for nine years before his arrest.

Terrorism

¶4. (C) In discussing these cases and trafficking in persons cases, it became clear that Kripos does not cross check people it is investigating against any terrorism lists. Indeed, Norwegian terrorist watch lists do not seem to exist. (Note: See septel on Norway and the HSPD-6 which will discuss this further.) Coordination with PST (Police Security Service), which is responsible for countering terrorism, is at best ad hoc based on individual officer's initiative and discretion.

Comment

15. (C) This meeting reinforced our view that Norway is a relatively easy place for war criminals to reside, at least until they want to apply for Norwegian citizenship. Although the political pressures are forcing Kripos to ramp up its war crimes unit, prosecutions are still a ways off. Similarly, Norwegian coordination and action to counter terrorists is also limited.

WHITNEY